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RECENT DECISIONS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISTANCE REQUIREMENT HELD DETERMINATIVE OF RE-ENTRY
INTO COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Employee of defendant drove past an intersection two and
one-half blocks from customer's home and proceeded a considerable distance on a personal mission. Upon returning toward customer's home employee was fatally injured in an accident which
occurred six blocks from his destination. Held (4-3): Workmen's
Compensation award vacated on the ground that employee was
not within the course of employment at the time he sustained injury. Carnerv. Sears Roebuck & Co., - Mich.
59 N. W. 2d
263 (1953).
Virtually all Workmen's Compensation Acts provide that in
order to be compensated, the injury must "arise out of and in the
-

course of employment."

MEcEmm, OUTL=nEs OF AGEN.cY § 603

(4th ed. 1952); Brown, Arising Out Of and In the Course
Of Employment In Workmen's Compensation Acts, 7 Wis. L.
REv. 15 (1931). If the workman sustains injury which has some
reasonable causal connection with the conditions of employment,
while he is engaged in the performance of a duty for which he
was employed, such injury is compensable. McNicol's Case, 215
Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913).
The considerations determinative of questions concerning
"course of employment" (at least concerning reasonable space
and time limits thereof) under Workmen's Compensation are
much the same as in the case of an employer's liability for the
torts of his servant. Pnossm, TORTS, § 69 (1941). It is well
established that if the servant is on a "frolic of his own" and not
engaged in the performance of a function of employment, his master is not liable for his torts. Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501, 172
Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834) ; Krolak v. Chicago Express, 10 N. J. Super.
60, 70 A. 2d 266 (1950).
It is the general rule that if the accident caused by the servant's negligence occurs after he has passed his proper destination and while en route to his personal objective, the employer is
not liable. Freeza v. Schauer Tool & Die Co., 322 Mich. 293, 33
N. W. 2d 799 (1948); McCarthy v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378, 59
N. E. 1038 (1901). In some jurisdictions the entire unauthorized
trip, going and returning, is treated as outside the course of employment. Public Service Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm., 395
Ill. 2.88, 69 N. E. 2d 875 (1946); Curry v. Bickley, 196 Iowa 827,
195 N. W. 617 (1923).
Under the generally recognized "concurrent cause" or "combined purpose" theory, however, an employee may perform some
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personal task while still predominately in the performance of a
function of his employment, and be acting thereby "within the
course of employment." Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90, 167 N. E.
181 (1929); See Anderson v. Kroger Grocery Co., 326 Mich. 429,
40 N. W. 2d 209 (1949); RSTATEMENT, AGEN.CY § 237, comment a (1933). It should be noted that the primary purpose of
the servant's activity must be related to his employment, and not
his personal business. Marks v. Gray, supra at 93, 167 N. E. at
183; McNew v.Puget Sound Pulp Co., 37 Wash. 2d 495, 224 P. 2d
627 (1950).
The most troublesome aspect of the general problem of
"frolic and detour" has involved the determination of conditions effecting re-entry after the servant has deviated from the
ambit of his employment, completed his personal mission and begun to return, but has not yet reached his authorized destination
or point of deviation. M]EcHF, OuTLTnmS OF AGENCY §§ 392, 393.
The New York test of re-entry is that all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident of return will be considered in the determination of whether the employee was in the service of his
master at the time of the accident. Riley v. Standard Oil Co.,
231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921). Reasonable proximity within
space and time limits, and the employee's intention to act in the
service of his master are the essential guides in this determina-

tion.

RESTATEmENT, AGENCY

§ 237. It should be noted that in

New York a simple commencement of return in the direction of
the authorized destination is in itself insufficient to establish reentry. Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219, 223, 137 N. E. 309, 311
(1922); accord, Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192 Mich. 624, 159 N. W.
316 (1916). On the other hand, some jurisdictions do hold that as
soon as the servant commences to return he re-enters the employment of his master. Cain v. Marquez, 31 Cal. App. 2d 430, 88
P. 2d 200 (1939); Meyn v. Dulaney Miller Auto Co., 118 W. Va.
545, 191 S. E. 558 (1937). It has also been held that where a servant was not on a direct route toward his proper destination, although he had returned to a point less distant therefrom than the
point of his deviation, he was outside the course of employment.
rtwin v. Williamson Candy Co., 268 Mich. 100, 255 N. W. 400
(1934). However, once the servant ". . . has returned to the
place where the deviation occurred, or to a corresponding place
. . . where in the performance of his duty he should be" the relation of master and servant has been restored. Murphy v. Kuhartz, 244 Mlich. 54, 221 N. W. 143, 144 (1928).
The approach of the court in the instant case seriously restricts the conditions required to effect re-entry: the employee
must return to a point less distant from his authorized destina-
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tion than the point of his deviation, as well as be on a direct route
thereto. It may be questioned why the court did not consider the
"concurrent cause" doctrine, of which it seemed to approve in
Anderson v. Kroger Grocery Co., supra, when the facts tend to
indicate that the case lends itself to such treatment. In any
event, it may be concluded that the instant case mechanically circumscribes the conditions of recovery under Workmen's Compensation without regard to other circumstances which may more
accurately characterize the servant's activity. The more flexible
New York test of re-entry obviates the inequities resulting from
the application of a mechanical standard divorced from other circumstances.
J. A. Guzzetta

